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This paper outlines the fundamental economic forces that have led to the decline in
traditional banking, that is the process of making loans and funding them by issuing short-dated
deposits. The declining competitiveness of traditional banking may threaten financial stability
by increasing bank failures and by increasing the incentives for banks to take on more risk, either
by making more risky loans or by engaging in "nontraditional" financial activities that promise
higher returns but greater risk. This paper argues that most nontraditional activities, such as
banks acting as derivatives dealers, expose banks to risks and moral hazard problems that are
similar to those associated with banks' traditional activities, and that these activities can be
regulated as effectively as can traditional activities. One regulatory approach tomaintain
financial stability and strengthen the banking system is to adopt a system of structured bank
capital requirements with early corrective action by regulators. An important elementin this
approach is that market-value accounting principles would be applied to banks and therewould
be increased public disclosure by banks of the risks associated with their trading activities. With
this regulatory structure in place, banks could be permitted greater freedom to expandinto
nontraditional activities.
Franklin R. Edwards Frederic S. Mishldn
Graduate School of Business Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Columbia University 33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10027 New York, NY 10045
and NBERI. INTRODUCTION
The traditional banking business has been to make long-term loans and fund
them by issuing short-dated deposits, a process which is commonly referred to as
"borrowing short and lending long". In recent years fundamental economic forces
have undercut the role of traditional banks in financial intermediation. As a source
of funds for financial intermediaries, deposits have steadily diminished in importance.
In addition, the profitability of traditional banking activities (such as business
lending) has diminished in recent years. As a result, banks have increasingly turned
to new non-traditional financial activities as way of maintaining their position as
financial intermediaries.1
This paper discusses two objectives: to examine the forces responsible for the
declining role of traditional banking in the United States as well as in other coun-
tries, and to explore the implications of this decline and banks' responses to it for
financial stability and regulatory policy. A key policy issue is whether the decline of
banking threatens to make the financial system more fragile. If nothing else, the
prospect of a mass exodus from the banking industry (possibly via increased failures)
could cause instability in the financial system. Of greater concern is that declining
profitability could tip the incentives of bank managers towards assuming greater risk
in an effort to maintain former profit levels. For example, banks might make loans
Although many banks may be able to maintain their relative position as financial
intermediaries by engaging in "non-traditional" banking activitives, for policy purposes it is
important to focus on the economic forces that have undercut the role of "traditional"
banking. Indeed, an important question is whether important public policy issues are raised
by banks having to transform themselves into financial intermediaries that look morelike
nonbank financial intermediaries.2
to less creditworthy borrowers or engage in "nontraditional" financial activities that
promise higher returns but carry greater risk. A new activity that has generated
particular concern recently is the expanding role of banks as dealers in derivatives
products. There is a fear that in seeking new sources of revenue in derivatives banks
may be taking risks that could ultimately undermine their solvency and possibly the
stability of the banking system.
The challenge posed by the decline of traditional banking is twofold: we need
to maintain the soundness of the banking system while restructuring the banking
industry to achieve long term financial stability. A sound regulatory policy can
encourage an orderly shrinkage of traditional banking while at the same time
strengthening the competitive position of banks, possibly by allowing them to expand
into more profitable nontraditional activities. In the transitional period, of course,
regulators would have to continue to be vigilant against excessive risk-taking that
could threaten financial stability.
The first part of our paper documents the declining financial-intermediation
role of traditional banks in the United States. We discuss the economic forces that
are driving this decline, in both the United States and in foreign countries, and how
banks have responded to these pressures. Included in this discussion is an examina-
tion the activities of banks in derivatives markets, a particularly fast-growing area of
their off-balance sheet activities.Finally, we examine the implications of the
changing nature of banking for financial fragility and regulatory policy.3
II. THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States the importance of commercial banks as a source of funds
to nonfinancial borrowers has shrunk dramatically.In 1974 banks provided 35
percent of these funds; today they provide around 22 percent. (See Figure 1) Thrift
institutions (savings and loans, mutual savings banks and credit unions), which can
be viewed as specialized banking institutions, have also suffered a decline in market
share, from over 20 percent in the late 1970's to below 10 percent in the early 1990's.
(See Figure 2).
Another way of viewing the declining role of banking in traditional financial
intermediation is to look at the size of banks' balance-sheet assets relative to those
of other financial intermediaries. (See Table 1.) Commercial banks' share of total
financial intermediary assets has fallen from around the 40 percent range in the 1960-
80 period to below 30 percent by the end of 1993. Similarly, the share of total
financial intermediary assets held by thrift institutions has declined from around 20
percent in the 1960-80 period to below 10 percent by 1993.2
Boyd and Gertler (1994) and Kaufman and Mote (1994) correctly point out
that the decline in the share of total financial intermediary assets held by banking
institutions does not necessarily indicate that the banking industry is in decline. In
particular, banks have been increasing their off-balance sheet activities (an issue we
discuss later), and therefore their role in financial markets may be understated by
looking solely at the on-balance sheet activities. However, the decline in traditional




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































banking which is reflected in the decline in their share of total financial intemediary
assets raises important policy issues that are the focus of this paper.
III. WHY IS TRADITIONAL BANKING IN DECLINE?
Fundamental economic forces have led to financial innovations which have
increased competition in financial markets.Greater competition, in turn, has
diminished the cost advantage banks have had in acquiring funds and has undercut
their position in loan markets.The result has been reduced profitability of
traditional banking, and an effort by banks to diversify into new and more profitable
activities.
A. Diminished Advantage in Acquiring Funds (Liabilities)
Until 1980 deposits were a cheap source of funds for U.S. banking institutions
(commercial banks, savings and loans, mutual savings banks and credit unions).
Banks were subject to deposit rate ceilings that restricted them from paying interest
on checkable deposits and Regulation Qlimitedthem to paying specified interest
rate ceilings on savings and time deposits. For many years these restrictions worked
to the advantage of banks because a major source of their funds was checkable
deposits (which in 1960 and earlier years constituted over 60 percent of total bank
deposits). The zero interest cost on these deposits resulted in banks having a low
average cost of funds.5
Thiscost advantage did not last. The rise in inflation beginning in the late
1960's led to higher interest rates and made investors more sensitive to yield
differentials on different assets. The result was the so-called disintermediation
process, in which depositors took their money out of banks payinglow interest rates
(on both checkable and time deposits) and purchased higher yielding assets. In
addition, restrictive bank regulations created an opportunity for nonbank financial
institutions to invent new ways to offer bank depositors higher rates. Nonbank
competitors were not subject to deposit rate ceilings that restricted banks, and did
not have the costs associated with having to hold non-interest bearing reserves and
paying deposit insurance premiums. A key development was the creation of money
market mutual funds (MMMF's), which put banks at a competitive disadvantage
because MMMF shareholders (or depositors) could obtain check-writing services
while earning a higher interest rate on their funds. Not surprisingly, as a source of
funds for banks, low-cost checkable deposits declined dramatically, falling from 60
percent of bank liabilities in 1960 to under 20 percent today.
The growing disadvantage of banks in raising funds led to their supporting
legislation in the 1980's to eliminate Regulation Qceilingson time deposits and to
allow checkable deposits that paid interest (NOW accounts). Although these changes
helped to make banks more competitive in their quest for funds, it also meant that
their cost of funds rose substantially, reducing the cost advantage they enjoyed.6
B. Diminished Income (or Loan) Advantages
Banks have also experienced a deterioration in the income advantages they
once enjoyed on the asset-side of their balance sheets. The growth of the commer-
cial paper market, the junk bond market and the increased securitization of assets
have undercut their traditional advantage in providing credit.
Improvements in information technology, which have made it easier for
households, corporations and financial institutions to evaluate the quality of
securities, have made it easier for business firms to borrow directly from the public
by issuing securities. In particular, instead of going to banks to finance short-term
credit needs, many business customers now borrow through the commercial paper
market.Total nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding as a percentage of
commercial and industrial bank loans has risen from 5percentin 1970 to over 20
percent today.
The rise of money market mutual funds also has indirectly undercut banks by
supporting the expansion of competing finance companies. The growth of assets in
MMMF's to over $500 billion created a ready market for commercial paper because
money market mutual funds must hold liquid, high-quality, short-term assets.
Further, the growth in the commercial paper market has enabled finance companies,
who depend on issuing commercial paper for much of their funding, to expand their
lending at the expense of banks. Finance companies provide credit to many of the
same businesses that banks have traditionally served. In 1980 finance company loans7
to businesses amounted to about 30 percent of banks' commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans; today these loans constitute over 60 percent of banks' C&I loans.
The junk bond market also has taken business away from banks. in the past
only Fortune 500 companies were able to raise funds by selling their bonds directly
to the public, bypassing banks. Now, even lower-quality corporate borrowers can
readily raise funds through access to the junk bond market. Despite predictions of
the demise of the junk bond market after the Michael Milken embarrassment, it is
clear that the junk bond market is here to stay. Although sales of new junk bonds
slid to $2.9 billion by 1990, they rebounded to $16.9 billion in 1991, $42 billion in
1992, and $60 billion in 1993.
The ability to securitize assets has made nonbank financial institutions even
more formidable competitors for banks.Advances in information and data
processing technology have enabled nonbank competitors to originate loans,
transform these into marketable securities, and sell them to obtain more funding with
which to make more loans. Computer technology has eroded the competitive
advantage of banks by lowering transactions costs and enabling nonbank financial
institutions to efficiently evaluate credit risk through the use of statistical methods.
When credit risk can be evaluated using statistical techniques, such as is the case for
consumer and mortgage lending, banks no longer have an advantage in making loans.
An effort is being made in the United States to develop a market for securitized
small business loans as well.8
U. S.banks also have been beset by increased foreign competition, particularly
from Japanese and European banks. The success of the Japanese economy and
Japan's high savings rate gave Japanese banks access to cheaper funds than were
available to American banks. This cost advantage permitted Japanese banks to more
aggressively seek out loan business in the United States, which resulted to the erosion
of U.S. banks' market share. In addition, banks from all major countries have
followed their corporate customers to the United States and have often enjoyed a
competitive advantage because of less burdensome regulation in their own countries.
Prior to 1980, two U.S. banks, Citicorp and Bank America, were the largest banks
in the world. In the 1990's neither of these banks ranks among the top twenty.
While some of this loss in market share may be due to the depreciation of the dollar,
most of it is not.
IV. EROSION OF BANK PROFITABILITY
Not surprisingly, reduced advantages in raising funds and in making loans has
eroded the profitability of traditional banking.Two standard measures of
commercial bank profitability (shown in Figure 3), the pre-tax rates of return on
assets and equity, both indicate a decline in bank profitability. The before-tax rate
of return on equity declined from an average of 15 percent in the 1970-84 period to
below 12 percent in the 1985-91 period. Although bank profits improved sharply in
1992 and 1993, many observers believe that these profits are transient and are due





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Overall bank profitability, however, provides a misleading indicator of the
profitability of the traditional banking business.In the 1980's U.S. commercial
banks derived an increasing share of their profits from off-balance sheet activities.
(See Figure 4) As a share of total bank income, noninterest income derived from
off-balance-sheet activities, such as fee and trading income, averaged 19 percent in
the 1960 to 1980 period. By 1993, however, this source of income had grown to in
excess of 35 percent of total bank income. Indeed, if we look at bank profitability
excluding noninterest income, the declining trend in the profitability of banks'
traditional businesses becomes evident. The pre-tax return on equity excluding
noninterest income has fallen from 10 percent in 1960 to levels that approached
negative 10 percent in the late 1980's and early 1990's. (See Figure 5)
Thesame forces are at work in other countries. The loss of banks' monopoly
power over depositors has occurred outside the United States as well.Financial
innovation and deregulation are occurring world-wide and have created attractive
alternatives for both depositors and borrowers.Japan is a clear example.
Deregulation has opened a wide array of new financial instruments to the public,
causing a disintermediation process similar to that which has taken place in the
United States. European countries which have protected their banking sectors from
competition (such as Germany) will no longer be able to do so in the future with the
advent of European-wide banking.
In recent years banks in other countries also have faced increased competition


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mental economic forces in other countries have improved the availability of
information in securities markets, making it easier and less costly for business firms
to finance their activities by issuing securities rather than going to banks. Further,
even in countries where securities markets have not grown, banks have still lost loan
business because their best corporate customers have had increasing access to foreign
and offshore capital markets, such as the Eurobond market. In smaller economies,
like Australia, which still do not have well-developed corporate bond or commercial
paper markets, banks have lost loan business to international securities markets. In
addition, the same forces that drove the securitization process in the United States
are at work in other countries, and will undercut the profitability of traditional
banking in these countries as well. Thus, although the decline of traditional banking
has occurred earlier in the United States than in other countries, the same forces are
at work in other countries and will ultimately result in a diminished role for tradi-
tional banking in these countries as well.
V. HOW HAVE BANKS RESPONDED?
In any industry a decline in profitability usually results in exit from the
industry (often by widespread bankruptcies) and a shrinkage of market share. This
occurred in the banking industry in the United States during the 1980's. In the 1960
to 1980 period, bank failures in the United States averaged less than ten per year,11
but during the 1980's bank failures soared, rising to over 200 a year in the late 1980's.
(See Figure 6)
In an attempt to survive and maintain adequate profit levels, many U.S. banks
are facing two alternatives.First, they can attempt to maintain their traditional
lending activity by expanding into new, riskier, areas of lending. For example, U.S.
banks have increased their risk-taking by placing a greater percentage of their total
funds in real estate loans, traditionally a riskier type of loan. (Figure 7) In addition,
they have increased lending for corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts, which are
highly-leveraged transactions loans.There is evidence that banks have in fact
increased their lending to less creditworthy borrowers. During the 1980's banks' loan
loss provisions relative to assets climbed substantially, reaching a peak of 1.25
percent in 1987 and remaining high thereafter. (Figure 8) Recent evidence suggests
that large banks have taken even more risk than have smaller banks: large banks
have suffered the largest loan losses (Boyd and Gertler (1993)). Thus, banks appear
to have maintained their profitability (and their net interest margins --interest
income minus interest expense divided by total assets) by taking greater risk.3 (See
Figure 9)
The second way banks have sought to maintain former profit levels is to
pursue new, off-balance sheet, activities that are more profitable. As we have seen
in Figure 4, U.S. commercial banks did this during the early 1980's, doubling the
U.S. banks have an incentive to take additional risk because of federal deposit insur-
ance. Insured depositors have little incentive to monitor banks and to penalize them for
taking too much risk. This moral hazard problem is compounded by our de facto "too-big-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































share of their income coming from off-balance sheet, noninterest-income, activities.
This strategy, however, has generated concerns about what are proper activities for
banks and about whether nontraditional activities might be riskier and result in banks
taking excessive risk. For example, there is considerable current controversy about
whether banks should be permitted to engage in unlimited derivatives activities,
including being off-exchange (OTC) derivatives dealers.Some feel that such
activities are more risky than traditional banking and could threaten the stability of
the entire banking system. (We discuss this issue more fully at a later point in the
paper.)
The United States is not the only country to experience increased risk-taking
by banks. Large losses and more bank failures have occurred in other countries.
Banks in Norway, Sweden and Finland responded to deregulation by dramatically
increasing their real estate lending, which was followed by a boom and bust in real
estate sectors that resulted in the insolvency of many large banking institutions.
Indeed, banks' loan losses in these countries as a fraction of GNP exceeded losses
in both the banking and savings and loans industries in the United States. The
International Monetary Fund (1993) reports that government (or taxpayer) support
to shore up the banking system in Scandinavian countries is estimated to range from
2.8 to 4.Opercent of GDP, which is comparable to the savings and loan bailout in the
United States (which amounted to 3.2 percent GDP).
Japanese banks also have suffered large losses due to riskier lending,
particularly to the real estate sector. The collapse of real estate values in Japan left13
many banks, such as Sumitomo Trust and Banking Company, one of the world's
largest, with huge losses. Official estimates indicate the 21 largest Japanese banks
were holding over $136 billion of nonperforming loans --loanson which interest
payments have not been made for more than six months--but many private analysts
think that the amount of nonperforming loans may be twice as large. Japan's
banking federation, with the assistance of the government, has set up cooperative
arrangements to shore up the banking system.
Both French and British banks suffered from the worldwide collapse of real
estate prices and from major failures of risky real estate projects funded by banks.
Olympia and York's failure is a prominent example. Just as in the United States,
the loan-loss provisions of British and French banks have risen in the 1990's,although
neither banking system appears to be threatened by major bank collapses. In addi-
tion, even in countries with healthy banking systems, such as Switzerland and
Germany, some banks have run into trouble. Regional banks in Switzerland failed,
and the Germany's BfG Bank suffered huge losses (DM 1.1 billion) in 1992 and
needed a capital infusion from its parent company Credit Lyonnais.Thus,
fundamental forces not limited to the United States have caused a decline in the
profitability of traditional banking throughout the world and have created an
incentive for banks to expand into new activities and to take additional risks.14
VI. BANKS' OFF-BALANCE SHEET DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES
A good example of the controversy surrounding banks efforts to diversify into
off-balance sheet activities has been the increasing role of banks in derivative
markets. Large banks, in particular, have moved aggressively to become worldwide
dealers in off-exchange (OTC) derivatives, such as swaps.4 Their motivation, clearly,
has to replace some of their lost "banking" revenue with the attractive returns that
can he earned in derivatives markets.
Banks have increased their participation in derivatives markets dramatically
in the last few years. In 1992, U.S. banks held derivative contracts totalling more
than $8 trillion (notional amounts).5 Of these, 52 percent were interest rate deriva-
tives, 46 percent were foreign exchange derivatives, and the remainder were equity
and commodity derivatives.6 In addition, most of these derivatives are held by large
banks, and are held primarily to facilitate their dealer and trading operations.7 (See
Table 2) In 1992, the seven largest U.S. bank derivatives-dealers accounted for more
than 90 percent of all derivatives contracts held by U.S. banks (based on notional
As of thethird quarter,1993, all insured commercial banks held interest rate swaps
contracts with a notional value of $2.79 trifflon. See Bank Administration Institute and
McKinsey & Company, Inc., (1994) p. 5.
Federal Reserve call report (RC-L) data for U.S. banks for the first quarter of 1992.
See also United States General Accounting Office, (1994),p. 182.
6UnitedStates General Accounting Office (1994).
Salomon Brothers, (1994), p. 8. Based on qualitative statements in the banks' annual
reports, much of their derivatives trading is customer-driven.TABLE 2 —DerivativesContracts (Dollars in Billions)
December31. 1993
Trading Pct. total Pct. Total IQil
BankAmerica $ 876 95% $ 4j 5% $ 922
Banc One 0 0 39 100 39
Bankers Trust 1,867 98 40 2 1,907
Chase 919 95 51 5 97()
Chemical 2,371 96 108 4 2,47')
Citicorp 1,844 93 132 7 1,975
J.P. Morgan 1,424 86 230 14 1,654
NationsBank 208 94 14 6 222
Total/Average $9,509 82% $660 18% $10,168
Source: Annual Reports andSalomon Brothers, inc.
ALM: Asset/Liability Management15
amounts).8 (See Table 3) The profitability of derivatives activities for banks has
clearly been an important factor. In 1993, derivatives accounted for between 27 and
42 percent of the total trading income of four of the largest bank dealers.9 (See
Table 4)
The increased participation of banks in derivatives markets has been a
concern to both regulators and legislators because they fear that derivatives may
enable banks to take more risk than is prudent. There can be little doubt that
derivatives can be used to increase risk substantially, and can potentially be quite
dangerous.'° In the last year many banks sustained substantial losses on interest
rate derivatives instruments when interest rate continued to rise. Because of the
leverage that is possible, derivatives enable banks to place sizeable "bets" on interest
rate and currency movements, which if wrong can result in sizeable losses. In
addition, as dealers in OTC derivatives markets, banks may be exposed to substantial
counterparty credit risk. Unlike organized futures exchanges, there is no clearing
house guarantee to mitigate the credit risk involved in OTC derivatives. Finally,
derivatives are often complex instruments, and may require sophisticated risk-control
systems to measure and track a bank's potential exposure. There is some question
about whether banks are currently capable of managing these risks.
8UnitedStates General Accounting Office (1994) P. 188, Appendix V, and p. 182,
Appendix IV.
'Salomon Brothers, (1994) p. 9, Figure 5.




Chemical Banking Corporation S1,620,819
Citicorp 1,521,400
J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. 1,251,700
Bankers Trust NewYorkCorporation 1,165,872
The Chase Manhattan Corporation 886,300
BankAmerica Corporation 787,891
First Chicago Corporation 391,400
Securities Firms
The Goldman Sachs Group, LP. 752,041
Salomon, Inc. 729,000
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 724,000
Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. 424,937
Shearson Lehman Brothers, lnc.* 337,007
Insurance Companies
American International Group, Inc. 198,200
The Prudential Insurance Co. of America 121,515
General Re Corporation 82,729
Total $10,994,811
The 1992 annual report from which we derived this information was issued by Shearson
Lehman.
Source: Annual reports for 1992; and GAO Report, p. 188.TABLE 4 --TradingDerivatives --Contributionto Total Trading Income (Dollars in Millions)
i22 Percent 1222 Percent
Chase 201 28 $121 26%
Chemical 453 42 333 39
Citicorp 100 27 400 17
J.P. Morg;in 797 39 512 53
Total/Average $2,251 34% $1,366 34%
NA Not Available.
Source: Company reports and Salomon Brothers, Inc.16
An example of the concern about the growing participation of banks in
derivatives markets are the remarks of Representative Henry Gonzalez, Chairman
of the Banking Committee of the House of Representatives:
"1 have long believed that growing bank involvement in derivative products
is, as I say and repeat, like a tinderbox waiting to explode. In the case of many mar-
ket innovations, regulation lags behind until the crisis comes, as it has happened in
our case with S&L's and banks.
"We must work to avoid a crisis related to derivative products before, once
again, ...the taxpayer is left holding the bag.""
In May, 1994, Rep. Henry B. Gonzales (D., Tex.) and Rep. Jim Leach (R.,
Iowa) introduced The Derivatives Safety and Soundness Act of 1994. This bill directs
the Federal banking agencies to establish common principles and standards for
capital, accounting, disclosure and examination for financial institutions using
derivatives. In addition, the bill requires the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller
of the Currency to work with other central banks to develop comparable interna-
tional supervisory standards for financial institutions using derivatives. In discussing
the need for derivatives legislation, Rep. Leach said: "one of the ironies of the
development of [derivatives markets] is that while [individual firm] risk can be
reduced .. . systematicrisk can be increased." A second problem, Leach said, is that
in many cases derivatives instruments "...aretoo sophisticated for financial
managers."
Remarks made on the floor of the House of Representatives, Congressional Record,
June 18, 1993, H 3322.
'MarkKollar, (1994), p. 1, col 2.17
A further indication of these concerns are the plethora of recent studies which
have examined the activities of financial institutions in derivatives markets. Studies
have been conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (the "Promisel"
Report), the Bank of England, the Group of Thirty, the Office of the U.S. Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and, most recently,
the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO).
The GAO Report, released in May, 1994, focused on OTC derivatives and
concluded that there is some reason to believe that derivatives do pose a threat to
financial stability. The GAO Report raises the prospect that a default by a major
OTC derivatives dealer (and in particular by a major bank) could result in spill-over
effects that could "close down" OTC derivatives markets, with potentially serious
ramifications for the entire financial system. The GAO recommends that a number
of measures be taken to strengthen government regulation and supervision of all
participants in OTC derivatives markets, including banks.
The fear of a major bank failure because of OTC derivatives activitiesappears
to stem from two sources. First, the sheer size of banks' OTC derivatives activities
suggests that they may be exposed to substantial market and credit risk due to their
derivatives positions. In particular, there is concern that as OTC derivatives dealers
banks may be exposed to sizeable counterparty credit risk. This concern has been
heightened in recent months by the near-bankruptcy of Metallgesellschaft, Germany's
14th largest firm and a major end-user (and counterparty) in theswap market.
Second, there is a fear that regulation (as well as managerial sophistication) has18
laggeddevelopments in the derivatives area, and as a consequence banks may be
taking more risk than is prudent (and more than they even realize).
A. How Risky are Banks' OTC Derivatives Activities?
Much of the concern about banks' activities in derivatives market has centered
on their central position as major dealers in the swap market. At year-end 1992, the
notional value of all swap contracts outstanding was $4.7 trillion." (See Table 5)
Interest rate swaps were 82 percent of this amount, with currency swaps making-up
most of the remaining contracts. (See Table 6)Although detailed information
about the nature of these swap agreements is not available, it is likely that the bulk
of them are "plain-vanilla" swaps --anexchange of fixed for floating rates. As such,
these contracts are similar to "strips" of forward or futures contracts (such as
Eurodollar futures strips).Swaps are attractive to end-users because of their
customized nature, low cost, and longer maturities.
As major dealers in the swap market, banks have extensive counterparty
obligations and may be exposed to substantial market and counterparty credit risk.
The notional (or principal) amount of the swap contracts that banks hold, however,
is not a good measure of the magnitude of their credit exposure. Unlike credit
instruments, such as loans and bonds, derivatives transactions (such as swaps) do not
involve payments of principal amounts.Derivatives contracts require periodic
This amount includes interest rate and currency swaps plus caps, floors, collars,and
swaptionsoutstanding. Equity, commodity, and multi-asset derivatives are not included.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 6 -.InterestRate and CurrencySwapsWritten Annually by Underlying and
Outstanding (Notional Principal in BillionsofU.S. Dollars: 1987-91)
Type of Swap J92 1988 1989 1990
liiterest Rare Swaps
USS 287 366 545 676
DM 22 33 41 iuo
Yen 32 43 62 137
Others 47 126 185 345
Subtotal 388 568 833 1.264
CwrncySwaps
Yen-Dollar 24 35 53 48
Others-Dollar 30 35 40 33
Non-Dollar 32 54 86 132
Subtotal 86 124 179 213
Total Swaps Written 474 692 1,012 1,477
Total Swaps Outstanding
(at year-end) 867 1,328 1,952 2,890
Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association19
payments based on notional amounts but not payments of the notional amounts
themselves. For example, a swap of a variable interest rate for a seven-percent fixed
rate on a $10 million principal (notional) amount commits the swap parties to annual
payments to each other of the order of $700,000,with differences in future payments
depending on how interest rates move in the future. A party's credit exposure, there-
fore, is not the notional value of the contract, as it is for a loan, but the "replacement
cost" of the contract.'4 Thus, the typical derivative transaction involves a credit
exposure that is only a fraction of its notional principal.
The GAO Report closely examined fourteen major OTC derivatives dealers.
Together, these dealers held derivative contracts with a notional principal of $6.5
trillion,as of year-end 1992. The "gross"credit exposure (or "replacement cost") on
these derivatives, however, was far less. The GAO estimated the replacement cost
to be only $114 billion, or about 1.8 percent of the dealers' $6.5trillionof notional
outstandings.'3
In addition, this figure does not take into account the various risk-manage-
ment mechanisms that banks use to limit counterparty exposure.Bilateral
14 Measured as of a point in time,only counterparties with profitable positions have a
credit risk. A losing counterparty has no credit risk. For example, assume that, under an
interest rate swap agreement, a firm receives fixed-interest payments and pays floating rates.
At the inception of this swap, the market value of the firm's position in the swap may be
zero. If, subsequently, interest rates decline substantially, the firm will receive more that it
will pay, so the fu-m will have a valuable or profitable position in the swap. This value,
created by the change in interest rates, is the firm's "replacement cost" for the swap, and
represents the credit risk to which it is exposed. If its counterparty defaults on future swap
payments, the replacement cost is the cost to the firm of replacing the swap on the same
favorable terms.
These include both swaps and forward contracts.20
contractualnetting provisions,which allow banks to offset losses with gains from
othercontractsoutstanding with adefaultingparty and its corporate affiliates, are
common.Also, when swaps are undertaken with lower-quality parties, such
counterparties are usually required to post collateral on a mark-to-market basis.
After taking these risk-reducing mechanisms into account, the GAO Report estimat-
ed the "net" credit exposure of the fourteen dealers to be only $68 billion, or about
1 percent of the notional value of their outstanding derivative contracts.
This credit exposure is managed by banks in a variety of ways. Internal credit
limits are commonly used to diversify credit risk and to restrict the size of exposures
to individual counterparties, industries and countries. Most counterparties in swap
transactions are required to have investment grade ratings,'6 and credit "triggers'
frequently require the automatic termination of a swap agreement if the credit rating
of either party falls below a prespecified threshold (such as a single A rating).
To put banks' derivatives credit exposures in perspective, the derivatives
exposures of bank-derivatives dealers' can be compared to credit exposures that the
same banks have as a consequence of their loan portfolios!7 For the seven largest
U.S. bank-derivatives dealers, derivatives-related "gross" credit exposures, as a
percentage of bank equity, were generally less than a fourth of their loan exposures.
(See Figure 10) Only Bankers Trust New York Corporation, which is probably the
most active bank in derivatives markets, had a "gross"derivatives credit exposure far
16UnitedStates General Accounting Office (1994), p. 59, Table 3.1.


























































































































































































































































































in excess of their loan exposure. While it is true that banks' credit exposure to
derivatives is substantial --itexceeds 100 percent of the equity of all of the surveyed
banks, a bank's capital would be wiped out by derivatives' losses only if Jj
counterparties were to default, there were no offsetting netting agreements or other
risk-reduction mechanisms in force, and actual counterparty losses were identical to
total credit exposures. Such assumptions are extreme, for loan defaults as well as for
derivatives-related exposures.
Properly measured, therefore, banks' credit-risk exposures associated with
their OTC derivatives activities do not seem out of proportion to their other credit
exposures, such as the exposure they have to defaults on their loan portfolio. Banks
also appear to be managing these derivative-related exposures reasonably well.
Indeed, the GAO reported that actual losses incurred by derivatives dealers as a
result of counterparty defaults have been quite small: 0.2 percent of their combined
gross credit exposure.'8
Finally, derivatives activities also clearly can be used by banks to increase
their exposure to changes in interest rates and exchange rates (or to increase their
market risk). This kind of risk, however, is hardly new to banks. Banks have always
been exposed to such risks because of their holdings of fixed-rate, long-term, loans
and secuities, and because of their foreign operations and foreign currency positions.
Derivatives can be used either to increase or decrease these risks. Derivative
exposures, just as all other market risks, must be managed prudently.
'UnitedStates General Accounting Office (1994), p. 55.22
B. Regulation of Banks' Derivatives Activities
There has also been concern that banks may be taking excessive risk in their
derivatives activities because of lax regulation.'9 Indeed, the GAO Report suggests
that there may be an intrinsic regulatory problem associated with banks' dealing in
OJC derivatives.
"The regulation of banks is essential, because they have deposit insurance
and direct access to the Federal Reserve's discount window. At the same time,
however, this combination of deposit insurance and access also can result in potential
problems because it may induce the banks and their customers to inappropriately rely
on such backing. Therefore, banks may be willing to run greater risks in their trading
activities --inrelation to their capital --thanotherwise would be the case. In addi-
tion, market participants may prefer using banks for derivatives and related trading
activities simply because banks are perceived to be safer counterparties. In the past,
similar concerns caused us to recommend that nontraditional banking activities, such
as those associated with underwriting and dealing in corporate debt and equity
securities, be conducted only by well-managed and well-capitalized banks in separate
subsidiaries of the bank holding company. Whether derivatives should be placed in
this category depends on regulators' determinations on how they are being used by
individual banks."2°
An important question, therefore, is whether banks' derivatives activities are
different from other bank activities such that they cannot be effectively regulated.
Is there something special about derivatives that makes it more difficult or even
impossible for prudential regulation to protect the federal deposit insurance fund and
taxpayers? A key issue is whether bank capital requirements, the central component
of prudential regulation, can be successfully applied to banks' derivatives activities.
If not, there may be an argument for either prohibiting derivatives activities (or
19Fora review of the current regulation of banks' derivatives activities, see United
States General Accounting Office (1994), pp. 69-84.
20UnitedStates General Accounting Office (1994), p. 125.23
possibly dealer activities) or segregating them into separately-capitalized bank affili-
ates.2'
Banks' derivatives activities are already subject to extensive prudential
regulation. Both U.S. and Basle Accord capital requirements apply to U.S. banks'
derivatives activities. U.S banks are required to comply with two different types of
capital requirements --arisk-based requirement and a leverage ratio requirement.
The risk-based requirement applies to the credit risk associated with derivatives
contracts or activities. The leverage ratio requires banks to hold capital as a cushion
against losses arising from other risks associated with derivative positions, such as
operations risk. Not surprisingly, there is considerable controversy about whether
these capital requirements are too low or too high.
The more important question, however, is whether an,y capital requirements
on derivatives activities can successfully control banks' risk-taking. Some argue that
derivatives are so complex and so non-transparent that it is impossible for regulators
to devise capital regulations to control banks' risk-taldng (or, for that matter, for the
market to monitor banks' derivatives activities).
We are skeptical about this view. Although some derivatives instruments are
undoubtedly complex, exposure to derivatives risk does not seem much different from
exposure to many other bank activities, such as credit risk in a loan portfolio or
interest-rate risk on a variety of fixed-income securities. Banks can achieve high
21Alternatively,there may be an argument for some form of "narrow banking," where
the deposit-taking function of the bank is separated from other activitIes of banks, such as
their derivatives activities.24
leverage in a number of ways other than through derivatives, and can quickly change
(or increase) their risk exposure in many different ways. While it is not clear how
much capital should be required for a given derivatives risk exposure, and regulators
may need to do some "catching-up," these implementation problems are not unique
to derivatives activities.All new bank activities are likely to present similar
problems.
Thus, banks' recent push into derivatives activities raises all of the questions
commonly raised when banks engage in new off-balance sheet activities. Are these
activities too risky for banks? Do banks have the managerial capacity toengage in
these activities in a safe way? Can these activities be effectively regulated? The
challenges posed by these questions are no different for derivatives than they are for
other banking activities.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The decline of traditional banking presents a challenge to regulators and
policy-makers. On the one hand, banks may respond to their shrinking intermediary
role and diminished profitability by taking greater risk, which, if unchecked, could
undermine the stability of the banking system. There is some evidence that banks
have in fact increased their risk-taking, either through riskier strategies in their tradi-
tional business lines or by seeking out new and more riskier activities. On the other
hand, long-run financial stability would benefit from a restructuring of the banking
industry that strengthens the competitive position of banks. To achieve thismay25
requireeliminating unnecessary (non-prudential) regulations and permitting banks
to enter new markets and to engage in new activities.
One approach to achieving these dual objectives is to couple adequate capita]
requirements for banks with early corrective action by regulators in order to prevent
capital from falling below specified levels! Requiring banks to hold adequate
capital promotes financial stability in two ways. First, it provides a greater cushion
with which banks can absorb losses, lessening the likelihood of failure. Second, with
more capital at risk, banks have less incentive to take excessive risk --theyhave
more to lose if their bets go wrong. To assure that banks hold the requisite
amount of capital and do not engage in either excessively risky or illegal activities,
supervision and field examinations of banks would continue to be necessary.24
Requiring early corrective action by regulators, to recapitalize a bank that has
suffered an erosion in its capital, promotes stability in three ways. First, it provides
predictability for banks and bank shareholders.Certain regulatory actions
predictably follow certain economic events. Second, it prevents a bank's capital from
falling to levels that threaten losses to the bank insurance fund. In addition, by
This approach is discussed extensively in Benston and Kaufman (1988).
To ameliorate the problem of potentially higher capital requirements imposing
additional costs on banks, bank capital could be defmed to include subordinated debentures
with a remaining maturity of at least two years and which are unredeemable for at least two
years.
24 As Gorton and Rosen (1994) point out, corporate control (agency) issues may also
contribute to excessive risk-taking when traditional banking business declines. Thus steps
to control this agency problem may also be needed to control risk-taking. How to
accomplish this requires additional research and is beyond the scope of this paper.26
requiring banks always to have a positive net worth, the moral hazard problem is
mitigated --bankswill have something to lose by taking excessive risk. Lastly, early
corrective action mitigates the regulatory forbearance problem by preventing
regulators from using their discretion about whether or not to take action!
Regulators can no longer gamble with taxpayer funds.26
A benefit of this regulatory strategy is that regulation need no longer restrict
banks' activities. As long as banks must hold sufficient capital against whatever
activities they engage in, taxpayers will be protected and banks will have an incentive
to avoid excessive risk-taking. Further, freedom to offer additional products and
services will better enable banks to compete with nonbank competitors (and with
foreign banks), and will make banks less susceptible to failure because they will be
better diversified. (An example of such diversification benefits is casualty insurance,
where losses are due principally to acts of god and have a very low correlation with
the losses that banks typically incur, which are due primarily to adverse economic
events.)
A key component of this approach is that bank risk exposures need to be
measured accurately and capital requirements be set high enough to deter excessive
As capital declined below certain "trigger" levels, for example, regulatory authorities
would be required to take specific actions, such as restricting the ability of the bank to
expand and preventing the bank from paying dividends and interest on subordinated
debentures.
26TheFDIC Improvement Act of 1991 enacted a weaker version of this regulatory
approach. The legislation, nevertheless, appears to be working reasonably well in reducing
the costs associated with bank failures and in producing a healthier banking industry. See
Kaufman, (1994).27
risk-taking.This requires, among other things, the adoption of market-value
accounting principles for valuing bank assets and liabilities.Historical-cost
accounting principles do not assure that changes in the economic value of a bank's
assets and liabilities will be reflected in its true net worth. It is the market value of
a bank's assets and liabilities, and the market value of its equity capital, that
determines a bank's economic solvency. Further, the market value of a bank's net
worth is what the bank risks when it takes additional risk.
Objections to market-value-based capital requirements center on the difficulty
of making accurate market-value estimates of assets and liabilities. Historical-cost
accounting has an important advantage in that it is easier to value assets and
liabilities. Market-value accounting, in contrast, requires estimates and approxima-
tions that are harder to justify and are often more expensive to obtain. Despite these
difficulties, market-value accounting may still be able to provide a more accurate
picture of a bank's economic condition. Clearly, an important research topic for
regulatory authoritiesis to examine the feasibility of applying market-value
accounting principles to banking institutions.
Adoption of market-value accounting would have the additional advantage of
making a bank's condition more transparent and therefore making regulators and
politicians more accountable. Regulators and politicians are subject to a principal-
agent problem: they often have an incentive to hide potential problems, even though
taxpayers would be better off if they dealt with these problems sooner rather than
later (or not at all). Market-value accounting would make it easier for taxpayers to28
monitor the actions of regulators and politicians, and would make it more difficult
for regulators to engage in policies of forbearance. Finally, better public disclosure
of the risks that are incurred by all financial institutions, including banks, would
increase market efficiency and bolster market discipline. In particular, banks should
have to provide a meaningful depiction of the risks associated with their trading
activities, both in derivatives and in on-balance sheet securities, and of their ability
to manage these risks. More public information about the risks incurred by banks
will better enable stockholders, creditors and depositors to evaluate and monitor
banks, and will act as a deterrent to excessive risk-taking. This view is consistent
with a recent discussion paper issued the Euro—currency Standing Committee of the
6-10CentralBanks (1994), which goes so far as to recommend that estimates of
financial risk generated by firms' own internal risk management systems be adapted
for public disclosure purposes.27 Such information would supplement disclosures
based on traditional accounting conventions by providing information about risk
exposures and risk management that is not normally included in conventional balance
sheet and income-statement reports.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The decline of traditional banking entails a risk to the financial system only
if regulators fail to adapt their policies to the new financial environment which is
27See also the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1994), which is a companion piece
to the Euro-currency Standing Committee's report.29
emerging. A constructive regulatory approach is to adopt a system of structured
bank capital requirements together with early corrective action by regulators. An
important element of this system is the adoption of market-value accounting
principles for all financial institutions. In addition, greater public disclosure by all
financial institutions of the risks associated with their trading activities would be
beneficial. Lastly, to enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of financial markets,
banks could be permitted to engage in a diversified array of both bank and
"nonbank" products and services. This general regulatory strategy, we believe, can
successfully keep in check excessive risk-taking by banks while providing the
flexibility for both banks arid regulators to restructure the banking system in order
to achieve greater long-term stability. Finally, we do not view banks' off-balance
sheet activities, such as their derivatives activities, to be a threat to financial stability.
Properly used and regulated, derivatives can facilitate the management of risk and
increase the long-term viability of banks and the financial system.30
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